Thinking space: Ten truths about Australia's rush to mine and the mining workforce by McIntosh, Alison
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
McIntosh, Alison (2012) Ten truths about Australia’s rush to mine and the
mining workforce. Australian Geographer, 43(4), pp. 331-337.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/54688/
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2012.731297
 
 
	
	
	
Ten	Truths	about	Australia’s	Rush	to	Mine	
and	the	Mining	Workforce		
	
	
ALISON	MCINTOSH,		Queensland	University	of	Technology,	Australia	 	
	
	
The	sky	is	falling	because	the	much‐vaunted	mining	‘boom’	is	heading	for	‘bust’.	The	fear‐
mongering	by	politicians,	 the	 industry	 and	 the	media	has	begun	 in	 earnest.	On	ABC	TV’s	
7:30	 program	 on	 22	 August	 2012,	 Federal	 Opposition	 Leader	 Tony	 Abbott	 blamed	 the	
Minerals	Resource	Rent	Tax	and	the	Carbon	Tax	for	making	‘a	bad	investment	environment	
much,	much	worse’	 for	the	mining	industry.	The	following	day,	Australia’s	Resources	and	
Energy	Minister	Martin	Ferguson	 told	us	on	ABC	radio	 that	 ‘the	resources	boom	 is	over’.	
This	must	be	 true	because,	 remember,	we	were	warned	 to	 ‘Get	Ready	 for	 the	End	of	 the	
Boom’	 (David	 Uren,	 Economics	 Editor	 for	 The	 Australian,	 19	 May	 2012)	 due	 to	 the	
‘Australian	Resource	Boom	Losing	Steam’	(David	Winning	and	Robb	M.	Stewart,	The	Wall	
Street	 Journal,	 21	 August	 2012).	 Besides,	 there	 is	 ‘unarguable	 evidence’	 that	 Australia’s	
production	 costs	 are	 ‘too	 expensive’	 and	 ‘too	 uncompetitive’:	 	 mining	 magnate	 Gina	
Rinehart	 said	 so	 in	 a	 YouTube	 video	 placed	 on	 the	 Sydney	 Mining	 Club’s	 website	 on	 5	
September	2012.	Can	this	really	be	so?	What	is	happening	to	the	mining	boom	and	to	the	
people	who	depend	upon	it?	
There	 are	 in	 fact	 multiple	 ‘truths’	 about	 the	 mining	 industry.	 	 While	 many	 mining	
corporations,	 government	 coffers	 and	 individuals	 have	 prospered	 from	 the	 so‐called	
‘boom’,	 communities	 at	 the	 frontline	 of	 resource	 sector	 activities	 have	 not	 shared	 in	 the	
bootie	 as	 they	 had	 hoped.	 Rather,	 the	 reverse	 is	 true.	 Decisions	 favouring	 short‐term	
economic	 gain	 by	 globalised	 corporations	 and	 metro‐centric	 state	 governments	 have	
delivered	instead	a	range	of	adverse	localised	social	impacts.	In	these	places,	an	end	to	the	
rush	would	be	welcomed.		
Some	 truths	 in	 this	 tale	 deal	 with	 matters	 that	 many	 in	 industry,	 government	 and,	 it	
appears,	 academic	 research	 centres	 ‘captured’	 by	 the	 mining	 industry	 (Hamilton	 and	
Downie	 2007;	 Hogg	 et	 al.	 2012)	 do	 not	 want	 exposed.	 	 Nevertheless,	 it	 remains	 a	
 
 
substantially	 under‐researched	 area.	One	 reason	might	 be	 the	 difficulty	 of	 sourcing	non‐
compromised	research	funding	but	that’s	another	story.		
These	 truths	were	 unearthed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 our	 team’s	 ARC	 Discovery	 project	 researchi.	
Commencing	 in	2008,	we	 set	 out	 to	 address	 aspects	 of	masculinity	 and	violence	 in	 rural	
Australia.	 Analysis	 of	 secondary	 data	 highlighted	 ‘hot	 spots’	 for	 violence‐related	 harms.	
This	 influenced	 choice	 of	 study	 locations	 and	 serendipitously	 some	 fieldwork	 was	
conducted	in	mining	communities	undergoing	rapid	change.	The	presence	of	non‐resident	
workers	 (NRWs)	 –	 those	 who	 (mostly)	 fly–in,	 fly–out	 (FIFO)	 and/or	 drive‐in,	 drive‐out	
(DIDO)	from	metropolitan	cities,	other	parts	of	regional	Australia		and,	to	a	limited	extent,	
from	 overseas	 –	 were	 transforming	 these	 communities	 but	 not	 in	 desirable	 ways.	 But	
before	pursuing	this	point,	other	truths	need	to	be	established.	
Truth	 1:	 The	 end	 of	 the	 rush	 does	 not	 mean	 the	 end	 of	 economic	 returns.	 The	 mining	
industry’s	economic	contribution	to	GDP	doubled	from	1989‐90	to	2009‐10,	with	changes	
in	 workforce	 practices	 strongly	 influencing	 productivity	 (Topp	 et	 al.	 2009).	 The	 large	
increase	 in	GDP	8%)	 in	2006–07	accelerated	export	volumes	and,	between	that	year	and	
2010–11,	the	value	of	mining	exports	more	than	doubled.	Mining	industry	contributions	to	
total	exports	also	increased,	from	37%	in	2006–07	to	55%	in	2010–11.		
An	expanding	GDP	and	growing	exports	solely	evaluate	production	 levels	 from	operating	
mines.	 To	properly	 grasp	 the	 enormity	 of	 the	 rush,	 construction	 of	 and	 commitments	 to	
new	mines	must	also	be	incorporated.	Consider	this:	in	the	six	months	to	April	2012,	new	
projects	valued	at	$23.5billion	were	completed;	this	represented	22%	of	the	total	worth	for	
the	six	years	to	that	date	($107.5	billion	in	2011‐12	dollars).	The	extent	of	the	recent	ramp‐
up	in	activity	can	perhaps	be	better	appreciated	by	looking	at	earlier	years.	From	2000	to	
2006,	completed	projects	were	valued	at	only	$42billion.	Moreover,	the	value	of	advanced	
projects	 –	 those	 currently	 underway	 but	 not	 yet	 completed	 –	 was	 worth	 $261billion	 in	
April	2012,	 	a	staggering	6.5	times	greater	than	six	years	ago.	On	top	of	this,	 the	value	of	
projects	at	planning	stages	or	awaiting	approval	has	remained	at	about	$250billion	since	
2009.	If	these	levels	of	development	activity	are	to	be	maintained,	a	continuous	flow	of	new	
projects	is	needed.	Realistically	this	rush	cannot	last	indefinitely.	But	a	decline	in	the	pace	
of	 new	 developments	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 production	 from	 already	 operating	 mines	
necessarily	 stalls.	 	 The	 historic	 upward	 trend	 in	mining	 industry	GDP	between	 bursts	 of	
new	project	developments	illustrates	this.		
Truth	2:	The	rush	has	propelled	a	revolution	 in	workforce	arrangements.	The	rush	to	mine	
generated	labour	demands	which	could	not	be	supplied	from	local	sources.	Consequently,	
use	 of	 NRWs	 intensified.	 The	 practice	 itself	 is	 not	 new.	 In	 fact,	 in	 the	 Australian	mining	
industry,	it’s	been	around	since	the	early	1980s.	Nowadays,	however,	workers	are	hired	by	
contracting	companies	and	essentially	all	new	recruits	are	FIFOs/DIDOs.	Mining	companies	
 
 
which	engage	principal	contracting	companies	 for	project	works	are	effectively	distanced	
from	the	workforce.		
For	 all	 types	 of	 jobs	within	 the	 industry,	 12‐hour	 shifts	 rotating	 between	 night	 and	 day	
have	become	the	norm.	Rosters	vary	greatly	although	two	weeks	on	followed	by	one	week	
off	 is	common	for	mining	operations;	 for	construction,	 four‐week	work	cycles	are	typical.	
During	work	cycles,	NRWs	stay	 in	work	camps;	several	thousand	workers	 in	one	camp	is	
common.	 Whereas	 once	 these	 camps	 were	 found	 only	 in	 remote	 locations,	 increasingly	
they	 are	 near	 long‐established	 towns.	 	 NRWs	 and	 work	 camps	 often	 become	 highly	
contentious	 especially	 where	 there	 are	 clusters.	 Frontline	 communities	 experiencing	
conflicts	include	Port	Hedland,	Karratha	and	Geraldton		in	Western	Australia’s	Pilbara	and	
Midwest	 Regions;	 Coppabella,	 Moranbah,	 Middlemount,	 Moura,	 Miles	 and	 Chinchilla	 in	
Queensland’s	Bowen	and	Surat	Basins;	and	Muswellbrook,		Boggabri	and	Narrabri	in	New	
South	Wales’	Hunter	Valley	and	Gunnedah	Basin.	Named	regions	in	the	eastern	States	are	
also	key	food	production	areas.	
Truth	 3:	 Freedom	 of	 choice	 about	where	workers	 can	 live	 is	 being	 reduced.	Purpose‐built	
towns	 were	 often	 a	 condition	 of	 development	 consent	 for	 new	 projects.	 Since	 the	 late	
1970s,	 this	 approach	 has	 largely	 been	 replaced	 by	 a	 ‘no	 town’	 model	 (Storey	 2010).	 It	
would	be	unreasonable	to	expect	‘new	towns’	to	be	built	for	very	remote	or	short	mine‐life	
projects.	 Nor	 can	 a	 resident	 workforce	 for	 short‐term	 project	 construction	 and	 for	 out‐
sourced	 maintenance	 be	 justified.	 Moreover,	 giving	 workers	 and	 their	 families	 choices	
about	where	they	live	encourages	a	FIFO/DIDO	component.		
Increasingly,	 however,	 workers	 are	 losing	 freedom	 to	 choose	 where	 they	 live	 because	
rosters	 are	 starting	at	 airports	 rather	 than	at	mines.	 In	 fact,	 the	new	Bowen	Basin	Caval	
Ridge	mine	 is	 to	 have	 an	 entirely	 FIFO	workforce	 despite	 strong	widespread	 opposition	
from	frontline	communities.		
Clearly	 some	 FIFO/DIDO	 arrangements	 are	 warranted.	 Nevertheless,	 it’s	 puzzling	 that	
these	practices	 are	 replacing	 resident	workers	 in	 regions	with	 low‐level	 remoteness	 and	
recognised	project	longevity.		This	means	that	remoteness	and	mine	life	are	no	longer	the	
principal	drivers	in	decisions	to	use	NRWs.	Some	highly	productive	mining	regions	such	as	
The	Pilbara	and	Bowen	Basin	have	experienced	continuous	production	for	over	50	years,	
and	will	have	intensified	production	for	decades	to	come.	Industry	preferences	for	NRWs	is	
undermining	the	long‐term	sustainability	of	communities	which	unwitting,	often	unwilling,	
‘host’	NRWs.	This	policy	is	pushing	those	wanting	work	to	move	with	their	families	away	
from	 their	 frontline	 communities	 to	 city	 home	 bases.	 For	 instance,	 Bowen	 Basin	
communities	 lose	 residents	 to	 the	 metropolitan	 south‐east	 corner	 of	 the	 State	 and	 to	
coastal	cities	to	the	Basin’s	east.		
 
 
Truth	4:	‘Miners’	may	appear	small	in	number	but	FIFOs/DIDOs	are	alarmingly	large.	Despite	
public	 perceptions,	 only	 a	 small	 proportion	 of	 the	 nation’s	 workforce	 is	 in	 ‘mining’.		
Although	the	number	employed	in	mining	has	more	than	doubled	in	the	five	years	to	May	
2012	 (to	 266,600	 people),	 this	 represented	 only	 3.3%	 of	 the	 Australian	 workforce.	
However,	 these	 statistics	 need	 clarification.	 Only	 extraction	work	 from	 operating	mines,	
some	 support	 activities	 and	 exploration	 are	 counted	 under	 the	 ANZSIC	mining	 industry	
classification.	 Countless	 tens	 of	 thousands	 of	 construction	 workers	 and	 unidentified	
numbers	 for	 surveying,	 transportation,	 processing,	 out‐sourced	 plant	 maintenance	 and	
work	 camp	 operations	 are	 not	 included.	 Because	 these	 types	 of	 workers	 are	 largely	
contracted	NRWs,	 the	 industry’s	FIFO/DIDO	growth	rate	 is	 substantially	greater	 than	 for	
‘mining’.		
Disturbingly,	regional	forecasts	conceal	the	true	workforce	size	by	counting	only	those	 in	
the	work	cycle	of	rosters	and	leaving	out	those	away	on	leave.	This	means	that,	 for	even‐
time	 rosters,	 the	 total	 number	 of	 transient	NRWs	 is	 double	 the	 number	 nominated.	 The	
true	size	of	the	sector’s	workforce	can	only	be	speculated	upon	in	the	absence	of	industry	
disclosure.		A	conservative	estimate	put	the	number	at	around	200,000	NRWs	in	July	2011	
(McIntosh	and	Carrington	2011).		In	short,	little	is	known	about	NRWs	including	–	crucially	
–	numbers.	
This	 knowledge	 gap	 provoked	 the	 Australian	 Parliament	 to	 seek	 information	 about	 ‘the	
extent	and	projected	growth	of	FIFO/DIDO	work	practices,	including	in	which	regions	…’	in	
its	ongoing	public	inquiry	into	the	effects	of	these	workforce	practices	in	regional	Australia.	
Industry	submissions	did	not	attempt	to	supply	even	plausible	estimates.	Perhaps	there	is	
no	 genuine	 interest	 or,	 worse,	 an	 interest	 in	 disguising	 or	 downplaying	 the	 scale	 of	
potential	impacts.	Reliable	industry	information	about	the	size	of	FIFO/DIDO	workforce	is	
critical	for	planning	and	management.	
Truth	5:	Work	camps	are	clustering	within	long‐settled	communities.	Transient	populations	
are	 unevenly	 distributed	 within	 resource‐active	 regions	 and	 social	 impacts	 are	 greatest	
where	 camps	 are	 concentrated.	 Although	 NRW	 numbers	 for	 a	 single	 camp	 may	 appear	
relatively	 small,	 cumulative	 totals	 for	 a	 region	 can	 amount	 to	 tens	 of	 thousands	 and	
represent	large	proportions	of	the	local	population	(residents	plus	NRWs).	When	turnover	
as	people	switch	between	work	and	leave	cycles	is	factored	in,	the	numbers	and	impacts	of	
individuals	moving	through	frontline	communities	are	amplified.		
Work	 camps	 occupy	 a	 smaller	 ecological	 footprint	 than	 residential	 accommodation.	 This	
accounting	of	environmental	 impacts	 ignores	 the	reality	 that	NRWs	have	 two	residences:	
the	camps	or	other	single	person	quarters	where	they	spend	most	time	and	the	place	they	
return	 to	during	 leave	cycles.	This	 factor	never	 receives	attention;	nor	do	environmental	
costs	 of	 transporting	 very	 large	 numbers	 of	 FIFOs/DIDOs	 over	 many	 decades.	 Industry	
 
 
assessments	about	 social	and	environmental	 impacts	of	work	camps	and	 their	occupants	
are	mostly	deficient	and	imbalanced	and	are,	therefore,	deceptive.		
Truth	6:	There	 is	 industry	denial	about	 the	downsides	of	 the	NRW	model.	The	 industry	has	
demonstrated	willingness	to	commit	to	regions	through	development	of	mines,	wells	and	
supporting	rail,	pipeline	and	port	 infrastructure.	Unfortunately,	 investment	 in	people	and	
communities	through	a	locally	based	workforce	component	is	shunned.	This	is	difficult	to	
comprehend	 given	 recognised	 problems	 with	 the	 non‐resident	 workforce	 model.	 For	
instance,	NRW	turnover	is	high	(30‐40%)	and	resulting	lost	productivity,	recruitment	and	
training	 is	 costly.	 Conversely,	 resident	 workers	 provide	 continuity,	 commitment	 and	
ownership	 to	 jobs	 and	 communities	 because	 of	 their	 multi‐faceted	 stake‐holdings.	
Moreover,	 while	 some	 NRWs	 prosper,	 others	 find	 work	 and	 living	 arrangements,	
separation,	and	long	distance	travel	unacceptably	stressful	and	tough	on	good	health	and	
wellbeing.	Indeed,	the	industry	has	acknowledged	that	60‐70%	of	relationships	fail.		
Downsides	 for	 use	 of	 resident	 workers	 are	 centred	 on	 the	 cost	 of	 affordable	 housing.	
Expansion	 of	 housing	 supply	 in	 response	 to	 demand	 is	 often	 restricted	 by	 industry	
exploration	 leases,	 capital	 or	 environmental	 constraints,	 and/or	 delayed	 planning	
decisions.	Additionally,	mining	companies	buy	existing	housing	stock	and	residential	 land	
in	 case	of	 future	need	 and	hotel,	motel	 and	 caravan	park	 accommodation	 is	 often	block‐
booked	months	in	advance.	Acute	accommodation	shortfalls	have	been	created,	increasing	
property	values	and	rents	and	decreasing	housing	affordability,	particularly	 for	those	not	
working	 in	 the	 industry.	 	 Having	 lost	 affordability	 and,	 in	 some	 instances,	 diminished	
community	 amenity	 and	 wellbeing,	 locational	 appeal	 is	 reduced.	 Unavailable	
accommodation	 means	 these	 places	 become	 unviable	 or	 unenviable	 as	 long‐term	 and	
short‐term	destinations.			
Truth	 7:	Governments	 have	 facilitated	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 non‐resident	workforce.	 Industry	
workforce	 strategies	 are	 influenced	by	government	 taxation	policies	which	 favour	NRWs	
and	work	camps.	 	For	example,	companies	can	write	off	capital	expenditure	on	camps	as	
development	 costs	 and	be	 exempt	 from	 fringe	benefits	 tax	 for	NRW	 transport	 and	 living	
expenses	whereas	 subsidised	 housing	 or	 other	 living	 expenses	 for	 resident	workers	 are	
taxed.		
Independent,	 transparent	 scrutinising	 of	 industry	 practices	 and	 intentions	 during	 the	
approvals	process	and	subsequent	monitoring	is	inadequate.	Furthermore,	the	cumulative	
influences	 of	multiple	 projects	within	 a	 region	 have	 not	 been	 properly	 understood.	 This	
especially	applies	to	the	impacts	of	a	rapid	influx	of	large	numbers	of	transient	workers	on	
previously	 established	 settlements	 and	 citizens	 especially	 when	 NRWs	 represent	
substantial,	even	majority,	proportions	of	local	area	populations.			
 
 
The	rush	of	development	has	made	 informed	assessment	 in	advance	of	project	approvals	
difficult	 for	 regulatory	 authorities.	 In	 any	 case	 these	agencies	 tend	 to	be	 severely	under‐
resourced	 (in	 part	 due	 to	 staff	 being	 poached	 by	mining	 companies)	 and	 are	 subject	 to	
political	pressures.	Surely	conflict	of	interests	exist	when	governments,	major	beneficiaries	
through	royalty	payments,	are	also	the	sole	consent	authorities?	
Truth	8:	Frontline	communities	experience	intense	adverse	impacts	from	FIFOs/DIDOs.	NRWs	
have	little	or	no	attachment	to	workplace	communities.	They	are	not	regulated	by	informal	
social	 controls	 that	 traditionally	 characterise	 rural	 communities.	 Hence	 their	 existence	
gives	rise	to	suspicion	and	concerns.	 	Sudden	boosts	to	numbers	of	 ‘outsiders’	exacerbate	
levels	of	antagonism.	Perceptions	of	inequities	affect	acceptance	of	these	workers,	fostering	
an	 ‘us/them’	 mentality.	 Stark	 contrasts	 often	 exist	 between	 well‐paid	 industry	 workers	
with	high	disposable	incomes	and	others.	More	generally,	though,	the	metaphorical	battle	
lines	 are	 between	 ‘insider’	 residents	 and	 the	 ‘outsider’	 FIFOs/DIDOs	 whose	 presence	 is	
often	resented.	
As	 a	 group,	 NRWs	 exaggerate	 male	 dominance	 and	 shared	 spaces	 become	 highly	
masculinised	 places.	 Violent	 male‐on‐male	 assaults	 fuelled	 by	 excessive	 alcohol	
consumption	are	 regarded	as	normal	given	 the	dynamics	between	 locals	 and	NRWs.	The	
applied	 adage	 of	 ‘work	 hard,	 play	 hard’	 means	 that	 pub/nightclub	 brawls	 are	 common.	
Violent	 assaults	 are	 also	 common	 in	 some	 work	 camps	 although	 the	 privatisation	 of	
security	 operations	 usually	 means	 that	 only	 the	 most	 serious	 offences	 attract	 external	
attention.	FIFOs/DIDOs	are	also	largely	blamed	for	introducing	an	evolving	range	of	drugs.	
Excessive	 use	 of	 alcohol	 or	 drugs	 is	 supposedly	 deterred	 by	 industry	 testing	 regimes	
although	some	workplaces	have	more	effective	controls	than	others.			
NRWs	 are	 the	 convenient	 and	 readily	 identified	 scapegoats	 for	 divisions	 within	
communities,	deflecting	attention	from	equivalent	poor	conduct	from	locals.	Nevertheless,	
links	between	violence,	social	disorder	and	drunken	men	from	work	camps	and	other	 in‐
town	 accommodation	 create	 a	 climate	 of	 fear	 and	 anxiety	 about	 safety	 in	 frontline	
communities.	 	Greater	reliance	on	NRWs	 in	 the	 future	could	extend	rather	 than	diminish	
these	divisions.			
Truth	9:	Positive	effects	of	 the	 resources	 rush	have	 largely	bypassed	 frontline	communities.	
Economic	growth	and	diversity	 linked	 to	 the	spending	power	of	 the	mining	 industry	and	
workers’	 large	 incomes	 are	 not,	 in	 the	 main,	 experienced	 within	 frontline	 communities.	
Rather,	 the	 ‘fly	over’	 effect	means	 that	benefits	 largely	 flow	 to	centres	 that	are	 the	home	
base	 for	mining	 corporations	 and	 source	 of	 most	 NRWs,	 notably	 capital	 cities	 including	
Perth,	Brisbane,	Sydney	and	Melbourne	but	also	regional	cities	such	as	Mackay,	Townsville	
and	 Cairns.	 	 Even	 work	 camp	 provisioning	 is	 largely	 dependent	 on	 supplies	 sourced	
elsewhere.		
 
 
Expectations	 that	 improved	 infrastructure	 and	 services	 would	 be	 funded	 by	 massive	
royalty	payments	(around	$3	billion	annually	for	Western	Australia	and	for	Queensland	in	
recent	years)	have	not	been	realised.	Rather	the	reverse	is	true.	Increased	demands	placed	
on	 already	 stretched	 services	 (notably	 medical)	 and	 infrastructure	 (such	 as	 roads	 and	
hospitals)	 by	 NRWs	 further	 damage	 the	 institutional	 capital	 of	 local	 communities.	
Significantly,	 larger	 local	 populations	 due	 to	NRWs	 is	 not	 recognised	when	 governments	
determine	funding	allocations	based	on	population	levels.		
Truth	10:	 Independent	 research	 is	urgently	needed.	 Industry	workforce	 practices	 outlined	
here	–	large	numbers	of	mostly	male	FIFOs/DIDOs	contracted	to	work	demanding	rosters	
and	accommodated	in	camps	–	profoundly	affect	communities	at	the	frontline	of	resource	
sector	 activities.	 They	 suffer	 erosion	 of	 social,	 human,	 economic,	 institutional	 and	
environmental	capital,	amplifying	vicious	cycles	of	decline.	
	
Most	 impacts	 are	 acutely	 under‐researched	 although	 academics	 have	 identified	 some	
seriously	dysfunctional	sociological	effects	 in	 frontline	communities	(see	Carrington	et	al.	
2010,	 2011;	 Cheshire	 2010;	 Haslam	 McKenzie	 et	 al.	 2008;	 Petkova	 et	 al.	 2009).	
Consequences	 of	 these	workforce	 arrangements	within	 source	 (home	base)	 communities	
are	 similarly	 under‐researched.	 Some	 individuals	 pursue	 possibly	 once‐in‐a‐lifetime	
opportunities	for	monetary	empowerment	through	well‐paid	jobs.	Conversely,	absences	of	
NRWs,	notably	 fathers,	provoke	family	 tensions	and	social	costs.	Communities	also	suffer	
when	skilled	workers	are	enticed	away	to	highly	paid	jobs.		
The	 principal	 aim	 of	 this	 commentary	 has	 been	 to	 raise	 awareness	 about	 the	 currently	
unacknowledged	 scale	 of	 a	 FIFO/DIDO	 workforce	 and	 of	 adverse	 impacts	 concentrated	
within	 regional	 frontline	 populations.	 Workforce	 practices	 entrenched	 now	 will	 have	
ramifications	long	after	the	decline	of	the	current	resources	rush.	Compelling	reasons	exist	
for	 geographers	 interested	 in	 macro	 and	micro	 catalysts	 and	 consequences	 of	 change	 –
matters	 that	 affect	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 wellbeing	 of	 communities,	 their	 resilience,	
gender	imbalance	and	inequality,	and	internal	population	movements,	to	name	but	a	few	–	
to	immediately	and	earnestly	address	a	range	of	critical	issues	regarding	these	workforce	
arrangements	with	a	view	to	 influencing	the	 fairer	distribution	of	 impacts,	beneficial	and	
adverse,	especially	within	frontline	communities.		
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